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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
exemption from income taxes. His exemption was disallowed but the court
in holding that the three-year statute applied stated, "We are of the view
that if there are any omissions they were not on the part of the taxpayer
but of those who handled the returns after they were filed." 6
The Supreme Court in the instant case adopted the latter view. The purpose
of the five-year statute was to enable the Commissioner to investigate returns
where he was working under a disadvantage due to a taxpayer's failure to
include an item in his return. When the Commissioner has all the items
before him there is no such disadvantage7
Section 6501 (e) (1) (A) of the 1954 Code has "resolved the problem
for the future" s. The Code provision is not new, but is a clarification of section
275 (c) of the 1939 Code. The instant case would make the result under
both provisions essentially the same. Thus, under both Codes the Commissioner
has only three years to assess a tax deficiency where gross income has been
accurately reported and where no fraud is involved.9
WILLIAM J. MCMENAMtY.
LABOR RELATIONS - UNFAIR PRACTICES OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS - "HOT
CARGO" CLAUSE NOT A DEFENSE TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECONDARY
BOYCOTr PROVISIONS OF TAFT-HARTLEY ACT. - Labor union and contractor
were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which provided: "Workmen
shall not be required to handle non-union material." This type of provision
is known as a "hot cargo" clause. Sand Door Company filed a complaint
with the National Labor Relations Board alleging union violation of the pro-
vision of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,1 which forbids
unions to induce employees to refuse to handle goods for their employer
6. Slaff v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1955). "We . . . find no occasion
to further torture the meaning of the word 'omit'." The court had previously held contra,
O'Bryan v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1945).
7. The Court in the instant case stated: ". . . Congress manifested no broader
purpose than to give the Commissioner an additional two years to investigate tax returns
in cases where, because of a taxpayer's omission to report some taxable item, the
Commissioner is at a special disadvantage in detecting errors. In such instances the return
on its face provides no clue to the existence of the omitted item. On the other hand, when,
as here, the understatement of a tax arises from an error in reporting an item disclosed
on the face of the return the Commissioner is at no such disadvantage. And this would
seem to be so whether the error be one affecting 'gross income' or one, such as overstated
deductions, affecting other parts of the return."
8. Subsection (ii) provides: "In determining the amount omitted from gross income,
there shall not be taken into account any amount which is omitted from gross income
stated in the return if such amount is disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached
to the return, in a manner adequate to apprise the Secretary or his delegate of the nature
and amount of such item." Thus the burden is on the government to show that the
error was not ascertainable from the face of the return.
9. Where the Commissioner can prove fraud there is, of course, no time limit.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6501 (c). Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 275 (a), 53 Stat. 87.
1. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4) (A) (1952):I"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents, 0*0 to engage in or to induce or encourage the employees
of any employer to engage in, a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employ-
ment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services where an object thereof is
forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer
organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting,
or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer,
or to cease doing business with any other person."
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RECENT CASES
when an object is to force him to cease doing business with some third party.
The United States Supreme Court held, three justices dissenting that the
presence of a "hot cargo" clause in the collective bargaining contract was
not a defense to the complaint. Carpenters Local 1976 v. National Labor
Relations Board, 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
The argument for the union position in the principal case was based on
the proposition that both the employer and employee have freedom in
contracting terms of employment.2 Thus, where an employer has agreed by
contract that his employees shall not be required to handle unfair goods, it
cannot be said there is a strike or concerted refusal on the part of the
employees as contemplated in section 8 of the Act where they merely
enforce their contractual rights. This position was taken by the N.L.R.B. in
a series of early cases which considered the issue. In 1954, the Board
reversed its decision, 4 holding that the Act was designed to protect not only
private employers but the public interest as well; hence, an employer could not
waive by contract the provisions of the Act which effectuated that policy.r
Subsequently the N.L.R.B. took the position that although "hot cargo"
clauses were not in conflict with the Act, any direct appeal by the union
to employees inducing them to assert their rights under the contract provision
violated section 8.6
In view of the many changes of opinion by the N.L.R.B., the instant
decision should supply certainty to the law and remove secondary boycotts
under the guise of "hot cargo" clauses from the collective bargaining process.7
A study of the history of the Taft-Hartley Act8 seems to indicate a concern
over the misuse of secondary pressures and a desire to limit the economic
effect of strikes prohibiting unions from widening the conflict to neutral
employers who are not concerned with the primary labor dispute.9 Congress
apparently recognized this problem created by the "hot cargo" clauses and
inclWed section 8 in the Act to eliminate it.10
While the present decision limits the usefulness of the "hot cargo" pro-
vision in union contracts, it should be noted that the Court was careful to
observe that not all forms of the secondary boycott are outlawed by the
2. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923).
3. Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B.972 (1949), aff'd sub non. Rabouin v. N.L.R.B.
195 F.2d 906 (2nd Cir. 1952); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953);
Madden v. Local 442, Etc., 114 F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Wisc. 1953).
4. McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954). Two members dissented
relying on the reasoning of the Conway Express case and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. as the
correct holding regarding "hot cargo" clauses.
5. Ibid. See also J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332 (1944); National Licorice
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
6. American Iron & Machine Works Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 800 (1956); Sand Door. &
Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955).
7. "The 'hot cargo' arrangement is nothing more than the old secondary boycott
clothed in a new raiment of would-be respectability. But the sheep's clothing should not
conceal the wolf from the eyes of the law." Lloyd & Wessel, Public Policy and Secondary
Boycotts, 23 U. Cin. L. Rev. 31, 53 (1954).
8. For an excellent study of the history of the Labor-Management Relations Act, see
Michelson, Secondary Boycott in the Labor-Management Field, 30 Conn. B.J. 64 (1956).
9. See remarks of Rep. Landis, 93 Cong. Rec. A-1222 and Rep. Hartley Id. at 3424.
See also N.L.R.B. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 242 F.2d 932(6th Cir. 1957), where it was stated that the primary purpose of Congress in enacting
§ 8 (b) (4) (A) was to to protect the public interest from strikes or concerted refusals
at points removed from primary labor management disputes.
10. See Genuine Parts Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 53 (1957). But see, Milk Drivers v.
N.L.R.B., 245 F.2d 817 (2nd Cir. 1957).
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Taft-Hartley Act." A thought-provoking aspect of the case stems from the
inherent vagueness of the concept of the "secondary boycott". The difficulty
encountered in defining that term adequately would seem to leave the
way open for achievement of substantially the objectives sought to be reached
by the "hot cargo" clause through other means- It is arguable that a union
could insist on a higher rate of pay for its members when required to handle
non-union goods than it exacts when exclusively union-made goods are
utilized by the employer.1 2 Equally, a stronger wage policy with regard to
employers who consistently handled non-union goods might be effective.
It is felt that it would be better to declare "hot cargo" and similar clauses
void, as the union when bargaining for the insertion of such clauses, is merely
inducing the employer to agree to a secondary boycott in the future which
would nullify the intention and effect of section 8(b) (4) (A) of the
Taft-Hartley Act.
1 3
JAMES W. JOHNSON.
LIBEL AND SLANDER- PERSONS LIABLE- TELEVISION STATION WITHOUT
POWER TO CENSOR NOT LIABLE FOR DEFAMATION IN POLITICAL BROADCASTS.-
Television company broadcasted political speeches by the qualified candidates
for the office of United States Senator. Thereafter, a third candidate requested
opportunity to use the broadcasting facilities. The television company be-
lieved certain statements in the proposed speech relating to a North Dakota
corporation to be libelous and notified the candidate that it would broadcast
the proposed script only if demand was made under the provisions of Section
315 of the Federal Communications Act. The script was broadcasted upon
demand by the candidate, and the corporation brought action against the
television company and the candidate to recover damages for defamatory
statements made by the candidate. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held,
one justice dissenting, that Section 315 grants immunity to a broadcaster
from liability for defamatory statements made by candidates, if such state-
ments are germane to political issues discussed by candidates. Farmers Edu-
cational & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 89 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. 1958).1
The law of North Dakota makes radio and television stations liable for
defamatory publications.- Similar law exists in many states. 3 Section 315 of
11. In the instant case the court said, "much that might argumentatively be found to
fall within the broad and somewhat vague concept of secondary boycott is not in terms
prohibited."
12. The argument is that since employers can obtain non-union goods in many instances
at a price which is lower than that paid for union-made goods, that employer will ordinarily
make a greater profit from handling such goods, thus furnishing an economic justification
for a demand for higher wage rates with respect to such goods on the part of his employees.
Moreover, the proscription of the statute extends, as the Supreme Court carefully pointed
out in the principal case, only to the conduct specified in the statute itself, namely
(1) engaging in a srike or (2) engaging in a concerted refusal to handle such goods in
the course of employment. Since neither of these types of conduct would occur in a
situation where a union obtained a wage-rate differential for its members when required
to handle non-union goods, 'no violation of the statute would appear to be present.
13. For a more detailed discussion of the "hot cargo" clause see Burstein, The "Hot
Cargo" Clause, in New York University Eleventh Annual Conference on Labor 153 (1958).
1. Cert. granted, 79 S. Ct. 56 (1958).
2. N. D. Rev. Code § 14-0201 (1943). North Dakota also imposes criminal liability
for publication of slander by means of radio. See N.D. Rev. Code § 12-2815 (1943).
It should be noted that the broadcaster in the instant case alleged as a defense that it was
absolved of any liability for damages under the provisions of N.D. Rev. Code § 14-0209
(Supp. 1957) which provides: "The-owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound
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